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Few Reservations About Reservations
Madeline Morris*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States practice of attaching a package of reservations,
understandings, and declarations ("RUDs")' to its ratification of international human
rights conventions has been the subject of severe criticism by some human rights
advocates. As Professor Henkin has said,
United States adherence to human rights conventions, after decades of resistance,
should please all who support the international human rights movement. In fact,
many are not pleased. For the United States has attached to each of its ratifications
a "package" of reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs), which has
evoked criticism abroad and dismayed supporters of ratification in the United
States. As a result of those qualifications of its adherence, US ratification has been
described as specious, meretricious, and hypocritical.
Professor Goldsmith's paper 3 lays out a cogent argument in defense of the
American practice. The present essay will consider some of the implications of
Professor Goldsmith's article beyond the specific questions of US law. In particular,
this essay will argue that, far from representing a net loss for the cause of human
rights, RUDs actually play an important role in fostering the advancement of those
rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") will serve
as an example.4

* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. See, for example, US Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Ex Cal 17, 102d Cong, 2d Sess, in 138 Cong Rec S 4781
(Apr 2, 1992).
2. Louis Henkin, US Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AmJ Ind L
341, 341 (1995).
3. See Jack Goldsmith, Should InternationalHuman Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law? 1 Chi J Intl L
327, 335 (2000).
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 (1966).
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II. THE FLEXIBLE RESERVATIONS REGIME AS A HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY
The ICCPR permits reservations. Permitting reservations reflects a strategy of
garnering the greatest possible adherence to the precepts of the treaty by allowing
states to undertake some of the treatys provisions while rejecting others.' The
advantages of such a strategy are obvious. But there are alternative strategies for
promoting human rights that could be adopted. One alternative strategy would be to
apply pressure to all states to adopt an ambitious set of substantive legal norms
together with relatively specified mechanisms for their implementation and
enforcement. This approach, if successful, presumably would provide the greatest
protection for human rights. But states may be unwilling or unable to undertake or to
fulfill some proposed human rights provisions, for a range of reasons. The more
expansive and extensive the substantive norms proposed and the more highly specified
the implementation mechanisms prescribed, the less likely it will be that broad and
uniform adherence will be gained. To the extent that breadth and uniformity of
adherence are lost, the normative force of the rules will be reduced.
Looking specifically at the choices made by the United States concerning
whether to adopt each provision of the ICCPR, one may question whether the
optimal choice has been made in each instance. But the process has been the right one;
the decisions have been made through the appropriate political decision-making
process. A political decision could have been made simply to adopt the ICCPR
wholesale, but that was not the choice made. Had the ICCPR by its terms required
wholesale adoption-had it been an all-or-nothing choice-then the treaty might well
have been rejected by the United States. Happily, the decision reflected in the ICCPR
itself is not to require wholesale adoption. Rather, by permitting reservations, the
treaty allows states to pick and choose which obligations to undertake, as long as those
choices are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.6
This limitation-that reservations are permissible if and only if they are
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty-makes that compatibility
determination crucial. There are a number of possible approaches to determining
whether particular reservations are compatible with the object and purpose of a
5. For a discussion of the historical development of the flexible regime governing reservations to
multilateral treaties, see Catherine Redgwell, Universality or Integrity?Some Reflections on Reservations to
General MultilateralTreaties,64 British YB Intl L 245 (1993).
6. As stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
A State may, when signing, ratifying. accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not filling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1761 UNTS 316, Art 19 (1969).
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human rights treaty-' (And there remains the related question, which I will not
consider here, of who is to make that compatibility determination.)8 In pursuing the
strategy of garnering the greatest possible treaty adherence by allowing states
flexibility in selecting the provisions to which they will adhere, it would seem advisable
to take an inclusive rather than a restrictive approach to permitting reservations. If a
state's ratification of the ICCPR genuinely advances some of the treaty's purposes but,
due to reservations, does not advance all of the treaty's purposes, the reservations are
not thereby necessarily rendered "incompatible" with the treaty's purposes.
It may be that certain ICCPR provisions should be considered absolute
minimum standards and, perhaps, reservations to those provisions should be
considered incompatible with the treaty's purposes. If so, then those provisions could
be identified as such (though that process of identification would itself be complex
and controversial).9 There is, in any case, no basis for presuming that the ICCPR
consists entirely of irreducible minima'0 such that no substantive reservations could be
compatible with the treaty's purposes. There is a difference between frustrating the
purposes of a treaty and fulfilling some, but not all, of its purposes. The effect of
arguing that virtually all substantive reservations are incompatible with the object and
purpose of the ICCPR is to lose the strategic benefits that the flexible reservations
regime was designed to afford. Putting the point differently, we cannot have it both
ways; we will have to accept rejection of some ICCPR provisions if we are to have the
benefits of broader participation that the flexible reservations regime offers.
The flexible reservations regime, with its object-and-purpose test, is designed to
maximize treaty participation by states with different political, cultural, and economic
circumstances while, at the same time, retaining the integrity of the treaties
sufficiently for them to be meaningful and effective." Looking at the relationship of
the United States and of other states to the ICCPR, we will find that different types
of flexibility will be required for different reasons if we are to have the broadest
possible meaningful participation in the treaty.

On the range of approaches that have been proposed, see Catherine Redgwell, Reservations to Treaties
and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24(52), 46J Intl & Comp L Q390, 402-04 (1997).
8. Id at 392-93,404-08; Redgwell, 64 British YB Intl L at 255-59,270-71 (cited in note 5).
9. For discussion of the identification of particular provisions in human rights treaties that are to be
regarded as minimum standards, see Redgwell, 64 British YB Intl L at 280-81 (cited in note 5);
7.

Antonio Cassese, A New Reservations Clause, in Recueil d'Etudes de Droit International en
Hommage APaul Guggenheim 304 (1986).
lo. Compare with Dinah Shelton, Issues Raised by the United States Reservations, Understandings and
Declarations,in Hurst Hannum and Dana D. Fischer, eds, US Ratification of the InternationalCovenants

on Human Rights 269, 272 (1993) ("[T]he Covenants are deemed to constitute the minimum
standard of state conduct....").
11. See Redgwell, 64 British YB Intl L at 279-80 (cited in note 5); P. H. Imbert, Reservations and Human
Rights Conventions, 6 Hum Rts Rev 28, 30 (1981).
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In examining the relationship of the United States to the ICCPR, one may begin
by observing that the law of the United States is so largely consistent with the norms
embodied in the ICCPR that major changes in US law would not be expected to
come about in response to the treaty." The major precepts of human rights law
embodied in the ICCPR (such as equality before the law; freedoms of belief,
expression, and association; rights to privacy and the like) are already essential features
of US constitutional law. The features of the ICCPR that the United States has not
adopted (such as the prohibition of execution of juveniles" or the prohibition of "hate
speech' 4) concern matters that have been considered and rejected in legitimate
domestic lawmaking processes. These "omitted rights" are, indeed, matters about
which reasonable persons, -apparently, may disagree. It is not clear why such matters
should be viewed as outside the realm of regular political decision-making. If a
functioning democratic process produces a decision not to undertake a particular
human rights treaty obligation, then it is hard to see what more there is to say about
it-other than to seek further change, if it is desired, through the political process.
In the United States, democratic processes have thus far precluded adherence to
some aspects of the ICCPR and some other human rights treaty provisions. Other
states may confront other circumstances that preclude their undertaking or fulfilling
some provisions of the ICCPR and other human rights treaties.
For instance, states that are emerging from violent conflicts involving widespread
war crimes or crimes against humanity may need to place reservations on the human
rights treaties to which they accede and, equally likely, may confront serious dilemmas
in attempting to implement even rather major precepts of the human rights treaties to
which they are already parties. The relevant treaties may arguably entail obligations to
prosecute perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity."5 But such
states (particularly new or transitional regimes) may be unable to conduct such
prosecutions without the risk of civil war or something closely resembling it. 6 These
states also may have problems providing adequate due process at trial if they do
conduct prosecutions and may have problems providing adequate conditions of

In saying that US law is largely consistent with the ICCPR, I am speaking of the content of US law,
not about its enforcement. Enforcement problems (which the United States certainly has) would
not be remedied by changing the law to incorporate more substantive ICCPR norms.
13. See ICCPR at Art 6(5) (cited in note 4) and US Reservations, Understandings and Declarations at
para 1(2) (cited in note 1).
14. See ICCPR at Art 20 (cited in note 4) and US Reservations, Understandings and Declarations at
para I(1) (cited in note 1).
15. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Part i. The Legal Setting, in Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed, Impunity and Hunan
Rights in InternationalLaw andPractice24-70 (1995); Michael Scharf, Swapping Amnesy for Peace: Was
There a Duty to ProsecuteInternationalCrimes inHaiti, 31 Tex Ind LJ 1 (1996).
16. See generally Roht-Arriaza, Legal Setting (cited in note 15); Scharf, 31 Tex Intl LJ 1 (cited in note
15); Carlos Santiago Nino, RadicalEvil on Trial (Yale 1996).
12.
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incarceration for such sentences as may be imposed.17 The options available to states
under these circumstances will include formal or de facto amnesties, prosecutions that
fall below international human rights standards, or some combination of the two. Any
such choices may run afoul of some provisions of human rights treaties to which the
state is a party or would like to become a party.
In such post-conflict situations, full adherence to and compliance with all human
rights treaty provisions may be precluded as a result of internally disrupted
governmental systems. By contrast, in the United States (and some other states), full
adherence to all human rights treaty provisions may be precluded precisely as a result
of internally functioning governmental systems. For very different reasons in the two
sorts of cases, compliance with the fiill set of human rights norms proposed in the
ICCPR will not be forthcoming. There is also, no doubt, a third sort of case, in which
adherence to or compliance with human rights obligations-even the very core
human rights obligations-is not forthcoming because of internally nefarious
governmental systems.
The crucial question is: What response would best serve the ultimate goals of
human rights, given this array of reasons for less than full conformity with human
rights treaties? It may be unwise to focus energies on pressing for full conformity in
countries where the core human rights are legally protected but adherence to certain
provisions is not forthcoming because of a reasoned choice that has emerged from a
functioning democratic process. Similarly, as long as the core precepts are respected, it
may not be wise to focus energies on pressing for full conformity with human rights
treaties where conformity is not forthcoming because the governmental system has
collapsed or is confronted with circumstances that prevent full conformity. A wiser
strategy may be to reserve the focus of condemnation for regimes that violate the core
precepts of human rights or fail to fulfill the human rights obligations that they have
undertaken when they have the capacity to do so.
The best strategy for affording the greatest protection for human rights may thus
be to focus on attaining compliance on the core issues while providing appropriate
flexibility-a "margin of appreciation," as the Europeans call it's-on issues as they
move further from the core precepts. What that flexibility or margin of appreciation
will entail will depend upon the specifics of the national context and the proximity of
the issues at stake to the core human rights requirements. In some countries, applying
this sort of approach may mean, for instance, accepting some forms of amnesty or
other such concessions in post-conflict situations. In the United States, it may mean

17. See Madeline Morris, International Guidelines Against Impunity: Facilitating Accountability, 59 L
Contemp Probs 29, 30-31, 35-38 (1996).
18. See Laurence R Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, 26 Cornell
Ind L J 133, 136-38 (1993).
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accepting less than wholesale incorporation of human rights treaties like the ICCPR if
that is what emerges from the political process.
How to evaluate the compatibility of reservations with the object and purpose of
the ICCPR is a complex question. The rather modest point of the present essay is
that the compatibility determination should be made in a manner consistent with a
flexible strategy that fosters incremental progress through allowing for variation. The
flexible reservations regime was designed to foster the acceptance, and hence the
effectiveness, of treaties that foster human rights. We should not undermine that
advance by interpreting the object-and-purpose test in such a way as to exclude most
of the reservations that would be doing the work in garnering support and
participation in the treaties.
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